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US CAPABILITY TO MONITOR SALT AGREEMENTS

NOTE: this briefing can be keyed to the graphics found at the end of the text.

- Careful distinction must be made between monitoring compliance by the Soviets with existing agreements (an intelligence function) and verification that a violation actually has taken place (a policy decision).
- The Intelligence Community is now reviewing its monitoring capabilities in the event of a SALT TWO agreement. Because of the greater complexity of a new agreement, there will be greater uncertainties for monitoring, and hence more difficulty in providing policy makers with the intelligence needed for verification of violation or compliance by Soviets.
- Re SALT ONE, the monitoring record is good regarding developments in Soviet strategic forces: in essence, we believe there are no large scale covert deployment programs underway in the USSR at the present time.
- Re SALT TWO, monitoring will be much more difficult, mainly because each side will be able to choose the composition of its forces. That is, we will have to judge what kind of missile is contained on a launcher (MIRV deployment), or how many missiles are carried by a launcher which is capable of throwing from one to several missiles.
- The most difficult systems to monitor, because they have the potential for covert deployment, are mobile ICBMs and cruise missiles. In both cases, we will have trouble determining numbers of missiles, as opposed to launchers, actually deployed.
- The US position now for SALT TWO negotiations, on MIRV uncertainty, is that counting rules should be agreed which will resolve uncertainty or ambiguity in the favor of the observer: that is, any missile that is flight-tested with MIRVS is considered to be MIRVED, and any launcher that has contained MIRVED missiles is considered to be MIRVED. Without such counting rules, our uncertainty would be in the range of several hundred missiles.
- The same sort of problem exists with SLBMs: i.e. which are carrying MIRVS. Therefore, the US negotiating position is that all SLBM launchers of the same type should be counted under the MIRV limit. (SS-NX-18, for example.)
- Regarding qualitative judgments on systems characteristics (launch-weight, throw-weight), we are in a good position as long as telemetry data remains readable. Therefore, telemetry encryption as part of a Soviet deliberate concealment program would create serious monitoring problems.

- JUDGMENT: we do not believe the Soviets would engage in

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U.S. CAPABILITY TO MONITOR SALT AGREEMENTS

INTRODUCTION

I. Mr. President, the responsibilities of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Community in monitoring present and future arms control agreements are depicted on this chart.

Graphic I

A. It is important to understand that in the SALT business we differentiate between monitoring, an intelligence function, and verification, which requires inputs from non-intelligence members of the SALT Community and ultimately policy decisions at the highest level.

1. In monitoring Soviet activities related to compliance with existing agreements, the Intelligence Community is careful to report developments and not to judge whether or not the activity involved constitutes a violation of treaty provisions, the precise meaning and intent of which may be subject to interpretation.

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2. With respect to the on-going negotiations in SALT TWO, it is the responsibility of intelligence to provide assessments of our capabilities to monitor the relevant Soviet activities, but not to judge whether or not these capabilities constitute adequate verification of Soviet compliance with the provisions of the agreement.

B. I should also state at the outset that the Intelligence Community is currently engaged in a comprehensive review of monitoring capabilities with respect to a SALT TWO Agreement. Therefore, some of the judgments I will present are preliminary; others represent CIA positions and have not yet been fully coordinated with other members of the Intelligence Community.

Monitoring the SALT ONE Agreements

II. From a monitoring point of view, I believe that the Intelligence Community has provided policymakers with a clear and timely picture of developments in Soviet strategic forces that relate to compliance with the SALT ONE Agreements.

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- A. As you know, a number of Soviet activities identified and reported by the Intelligence Community have raised questions about compliance that have been raised with the Soviets in the Standing Consultative Commission.
- B. Despite the problems associated with detecting certain conceivable types of cheating, I believe that the absence of evidence of such activity can be interpreted as indicating that there are no large-scale covert deployment programs underway in the USSR at the present time.
- C. The reason for this confidence is partly the size and nature of the weapon systems we are monitoring, and partly the quantity and quality of the intelligence coverage of the Soviet Union. For example in the last half of 1976 we have obtained and searched cloud free photography of about three fourths of the built-up areas of the Soviet Union and nearly one half of the undeveloped areas as indicated in this map.

Graphic II

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III. Monitoring a SALT TWO Agreement

A. Monitoring a SALT TWO agreement will be much more difficult than monitoring the Interim Agreement.


1. While the Interim Agreement essentially froze the numbers of both fixed land-based ICBMs and SLBMs, the new agreement will establish an aggregate limitation of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.

a. This aggregate will include more systems than were limited by the Interim Agreement: fixed land-based ICBMs, SLBMs, intercontinental bombers, air-launched missiles and possibly mobile ICBMs and land and sea-based cruise missiles.

b. Within this aggregate, each side will have more freedom to choose its own composition of forces than under the Interim Agreement.

c. Moreover, once a side has reached the permitted level, it will have more

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options for exchanging one type of weapon system for another than under the Interim Agreement. We will be required to monitor these exchanges to ensure that they conform with established replacement procedures.

2. The new agreement will also limit each side's launchers for MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs. In order to monitor this limitation, we will not only have to count missile launchers, but also make judgments about the type of missile they contain.
3. Other monitoring tasks will include the monitoring of bans on certain types of strategic weapons, and monitoring ICBM throw-weight and launch-weight limits.

B. Let's look first at prospects for monitoring the aggregate limitation, summarized on the next chart.

Graphic III

1. Based on previous experience, we have generally high confidence in our ability to count the number of fixed land-based

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
ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers which are overtly deployed in the Soviet force.

2. There are two weapon systems the Soviets might deploy in the aggregate which would be more difficult to monitor and which have a high potential for covert deployment. These are mobile ICBMs and long-range cruise missiles.



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IV. Implications of Monitoring Capabilities

A. Mr. President: As we move from the interim agreement limits on numbers of large, readily, identifiable items (like ICBM and SLBM launchers) to more complex agreements limiting more difficult systems (like aerodynamic vehicles) and containing qualitative limitations (such as missile throw-weight), there are bound to be greater uncertainties in monitoring Soviet compliance.

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- B. The estimates of our capabilities to monitor individual parts of the prospective SALT TWO agreement which I have discussed today have already been made available to the SALT Working Group and the US SALT Delegation. They have influenced some draft provisions which have already been discussed with the Soviets.
- C. The overall impact of our monitoring capabilities and limitations, however, will be important to a final policy judgment about whether a SALT TWO agreement can be adequately verified.
- D. Your administration will have to weigh the net advantage of the agreement to the US in the light of the acknowledged monitoring uncertainties.

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GRAPHIC I

ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS

EXISTING AGREEMENTS

- INSURING THAT INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS CAPABILITIES ARE ADEQUATE TO MONITOR SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES
- MONITORING SOVIET ACTIVITIES RELATED TO COMPLIANCE AND REPORTING THE RESULTS TO POLICY-MAKING OFFICIALS
- PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE U.S. COMPONENT OF THE U.S.-USSR STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

CURRENT NEGOTIATIONS

- ASSESSING THE SIZE, CAPABILITIES, AND FUTURE POTENTIAL OF THE SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES TO BE LIMITED BY THE AGREEMENT
- PROVIDING INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO POLICY-MAKING AGENCIES AND OFFICIALS IN THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPING U.S. POSITIONS AND IN NEGOTIATING THE AGREEMENT
- PROVIDING ASSESSMENTS OF THE U.S. CAPABILITY TO MONITOR PROPOSED TREATY PROVISIONS

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